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WHP has everything that we need: fertile 
soils, optimal climate, food crops of all kinds, 
and much more. And the people of the 
province are exceptionally strong, smart and 
productive. But pride, prejudice, jealousy, 
conflict and violence can and do stem the 
tide of progress. And the lack of indigenous 
knowledge on healthy living is killing many 
of the province’s elite (Pastor Max Martin, 
Christian Leaders Training College, Banz).1
Introduction
Western Highlands is one of several Papua New 
Guinean provinces caught in the suffocating 
grip of poor governance. It has a woeful record 
of administrative ineptitude, dreadful financial 
management and political interference with public 
service functions. These are deeply entrenched 
problems that have been allowed to grow over time 
and are not restricted to a particular administration 
or government.
On a positive note, the last Western Highlands 
Provincial Government (WHPG), from 2007 
to 2012, did make some progress in the areas 
of asset management, planning and political 
governance, infrastructure maintenance, and 
interagency linkage. Expenditure on Medium Term 
Development Strategy (MTDS) areas improved 
slightly, with sufficient funding provided to some 
core sectors, although administrative costs remain 
excessively high, despite low fiscal capacity.
Under prime ministers Sir Michael Somare 
(2007–2011) and Peter O’Neill (2011–present), 
36 million kina (K) has gone to each district 
via the District Services Improvement Program 
(DSIP), but there is very little to show for it in 
terms of physical outcomes (number of classrooms, 
aid posts and rehabilitated roads). Much of the 
physical infrastructure of the province has been 
allowed to deteriorate over the years. Politicians and 
bureaucrats need to understand that government is 
there to serve the people, that regular maintenance 
costs far less than rehabilitation, that without basic 
infrastructure crops cannot be brought to markets, 
and services cannot be delivered.
This paper, first drafted in 2011,2 is based 
on firsthand observations in Western Highlands 
Province (WHP) over the past decade and a half, 
covering the administrations of three governors 
(Father Robert Lak 1997–2002, Paias Wingti 2002–
07 and 2012–present, and Tom Olga 2007–12).3 It 
uses insights gained while working for Governor 
Olga, and with the help of provincial officials. It 
outlines the common problems that hinder progress 
in WHP, describes some of the steps taken by the 
Olga government to rectify these problems, and 
explains why some factors will continue to stand in 
the way of development goals.
Background on Western Highlands Province
The strength of WHP lies in the land, its people, and 
various heritage properties (natural and cultural). 
The first two assets have been partly developed, 
while use of the third remains embryonic.
• WHP has approximately 1,100 square kilometres 
of very high potential land, which is the largest 
area in any province in the country (Hanson 
et al. 2001:127). The volcanic soils of the Wahgi, 
Nebilyer, Baiyer and Jimi valleys are ideal for 
the cultivation of various crops. Around 50 per 
cent of the land in the province is currently 
under agricultural use. The province grows over 
40 per cent of the country’s Arabica coffee and 
all of its tea for export, as well 
as an impressive range of fresh 
food for the domestic market. 
Approximately one-third of 
WHP coffee and 90 per cent of 
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the province’s tea crop comes from the Jiwaka 
(Jimi, Wahgi and Kambia) area, which broke 
away from WHP to form a separate province 
in June 2012. The economic implications of the 
creation of Jiwaka Province are explored later in 
this paper (see section on Economy).
• WHP is the home of the stereotypical rugged 
capitalist-type big-man, whose relentless pursuit 
of wealth is well known, and whose status 
depends on outshining rivals in competitive 
bouts of gift exchanges (Ketan 2004). 
Generations of Western Highlanders have been 
industrious, goal-oriented and thrifty. The 
people of the province dominate a number of 
key industries in Papua New Guinea (PNG), 
including transport (trucking, vehicle hire, 
taxis and buses), real estate and agriculture. 
Western Highlanders own and operate some of 
the country’s leading law and accounting firms. 
In terms of human capital export, the province 
has produced some outstanding academics, 
administrators, multimillionaire businessmen, 
sportsmen, and professionals in nearly all fields. 
Hopefully, socio-economic conditions in the 
province will attract some of the brightest sons 
and daughters of the province to return home 
to work there.
• In Kuk World Heritage Site and Baiyer River 
Birds Sanctuary the province has two genuine 
heritage properties of international significance, 
which can attract tourists and researchers 
from all over the world, but the province has 
yet to develop and market these assets. The 
Kuk archaeological site has evidence of early 
agriculture, dating back 9,000 years, which 
makes New Guinea highlanders among the 
world’s earliest gardeners (Ketan and Olga 
2008). It is PNG’s only World Heritage–listed 
property. The WHPG has plans to develop the 
site, and has made small allocations towards 
preparatory work, but the national government 
has not been particularly enthusiastic in 
developing the property. The Baiyer River Birds 
Sanctuary has fallen into disrepair and now 
needs government funding to revive it. Some of 
the country’s rarest and most dramatic bird of 
paradise species and mammals used to live on 
display in this sanctuary.
Major impediments to development goals 
include the rugged terrain, and governance 
issues such as low fiscal capacity, excessive 
administrative spending, administrative ineptitude, 
politicisation of the bureaucracy, financial and 
asset mismanagement, poor infrastructure, and the 
uneven delivery of services.
• The mountains of the Sepik–Wahgi divide 
restrain development of the Jimi Valley in the 
north, while to the south the Kubor Range 
forms a rugged barrier to development of the 
Kambia region. Other inaccessible areas include 
the Lumusa, Ruti and Kaugel valleys. Many 
communities in the Jimi and Baiyer valleys are 
accessible only by light aircraft. The Hagen–
Madang Highway, currently under construction, 
will run through both valleys, thereby linking 
many isolated communities to markets 
and services.
• The National Economic and Fiscal Commission 
(NEFC) has estimated that WHP has a fiscal 
capacity of 68 per cent, which means that 
the province has only 68 toea for every kina 
that it needs to provide services (NEFC 
2010:19). The NEFC review of all expenditure 
in 2005 indicated that WHP had spent too 
much money on administration and too little 
on core MTDS areas of health, education, 
infrastructure maintenance, agriculture and 
village courts (NEFC 2007:25). A later NEFC 
report, however, indicates that WHP has made 
remarkable improvements by spending more 
on core MTDS areas of health, education, 
agriculture, and law and justice (NEFC 2010). 
Much of the spending, however, occurs in the 
final quarter, usually around November, when 
government operations are about to shut down 
for Christmas. This is a time when public funds 
often get misappropriated throughout PNG.
• The provincial bureaucracy lacks 
administrative capacity for planning and 
policy implementation, and is incapable 
of delivering services evenly across the 
province. Public servants generally do not 
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show commitment in their work, and there 
are no real incentives to get them working 
on a regular basis. Politicisation of the 
bureaucracy, through political appointments 
and constant interference in administrative 
matters by politicians, has resulted in mediocre 
performance and diminished returns.
• As a result of poor asset management, executive 
vehicles worth thousands of kina have been 
written off. A former provincial administrator 
bought a brand new Toyota VX 4WD worth 
over K100,000 from the provincial government 
for K9,000 while another helped himself to 
a new Prado 4WD, also at a ridiculously low 
price. Others, including some members of the 
Provincial Executive Council, acquired Toyota 
Land Cruisers. None of these vehicles were 
recovered.4
• Despite having one of the best road networks in 
the country, transport infrastructure has almost 
collapsed, owing to lack of regular maintenance. 
Hanson et al. (2001) concluded that more 
people in WHP have access to services than 
elsewhere in the country. This is not entirely 
true. Only those who live in urban centres and 
along the Highlands Highway have good access 
to markets and services, while those in rural 
areas receive few government services or none 
at all. The DSIP has made very little impact, 
thereby raising questions about the value of 
using parliamentarians as fund managers and 
service providers.
Crime, conflict and corruption are perennial 
threats to progress in WHP.
• Many banks, plantations and business houses 
in the province have been victim to armed 
robbery. The plantation economy almost 
collapsed in the 1990s, owing to high costs of 
security. In March 2004 local criminals shot 
PNG Airlines pilot, Captain Alan Mourilyan, in 
Mount Hagen town. A popular lay preacher and 
businessman, Max Bundrock, cited escalation 
in crime as a reason for shutting down his 
towing and repairs business and leaving PNG 
after more than 40 years in Mount Hagen.
• Many lives have been lost, properties destroyed, 
and plantations and service facilities shut 
down as a result of tribal warfare in parts of 
the province. Several large coffee plantations 
in the Wahgi Valley (Gumanch, Wahgi Mek 
Group, Wara Wau, Wurup, Rui and Mamgol), 
at least two in the Nebilyer Valley (Kaugum and 
Kilinga) and another two in the Baiyer Valley 
(Tigi and Kul) were abandoned as a result of 
gun warfare in the 1990s. The Kudjip Nazarene 
Hospital shut down for a week in January 
2011 following an attack on a nursing sister 
whose arm was chopped off by an intruder 
(Gumuno 2011).
• The provincial government lost its headquarters 
(Kapal Haus) in a fire in 2007. Many people 
believe that it was the work of arsonists directed 
by politicians; that the fire was intended 
to destroy evidence of corruption. Around 
K3 million in insurance cannot be claimed 
because of inconclusive reports by police and 
fire departments.5
• The Africanist Christopher Clapham identified 
two broad categories of corruption: parochial 
and extractive. He says that parochial 
corruption is generally small scale, fits into an 
existing set of values and obligations, and leads 
to the redistribution and exchange of benefits 
within a community, rather than siphoning 
resources from it. Extractive corruption, 
he says, is often large in scale, rests on the 
manipulation of state power, and maintains the 
lifestyle of a privileged class of state employees 
and their confederates (Clapham 1985:53–54). 
A junior clerk who receives rewards in cash 
for facilitating authorised payments (in other 
words, receiving extra payment for doing his or 
her job) would be a good example of parochial 
corruption, while a senior official who receives 
a large percentage for authorising payment for 
fraudulent claims involving thousands of kina 
is an example of extractive corruption. Both 
forms of corruption exist in WHP, but it is 
difficult to establish how much money in public 
funds has been stolen by public office holders 
and their associates.
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Successive governments at both provincial and 
national levels have not found ways to address these 
problems, or at least to minimise the consequences. 
Clearly, the PNG state is struggling to fulfil its 
constitutional obligation to protect its citizens 
and their properties from harm and, moreover, is 
nurturing a political culture of ‘politics of the belly’ 
(Bayart 1993; Bayart et al. 1999).
Many of the governance and administrative 
problems in WHP are associated with the political 
culture of the province. Widely accepted ideas, 
values and practices, including strategies employed 
in political competition, form the political culture 
under scrutiny here.
• Politicians rely mainly on tribal alliances and 
personal networks to win elections. Campaign 
hospitality costs hundreds of thousands of kina. 
Electoral fraud and violence have been common 
features of recent elections.
• Development grants, under the DSIP and other 
government intervention programs, are highly 
politicised and disbursed along nepotistic 
patronage criteria.
• Delivery of goods and services is uneven, 
irregular and inadequate. People in remote 
parts of the province do not have access to basic 
services, although the national government 
has been promising that the DSIP will rectify 
that problem.
The apparent failure on the part of public office 
holders to separate private from public interests 
has contributed to the province’s governance and 
administrative problems.
• Politicians and public servants fail to 
demonstrate that the government and public 
service are there to serve the people. They 
tend to use government resources to promote 
personal interests, with the aim of staying in 
power and/or amassing wealth.
• Public office holders regularly ignore the 
fact that the key to improving the living 
conditions of people lies in the transparent, 
accountable and equitable distribution of goods 
and services.
• The integrity of the political system (how 
people get into office, how decisions are made, 
how resources are distributed) depends on the 
quality of leadership. When leadership becomes 
corrupted by unrestrained power and excessive 
wealth, the political system in turn becomes a 
threat to society.
Governance and service delivery in WHP 
have been individualised by successive governors, 
particularly by the forceful styles of Paias Wingti 
and Tom Olga, which have embraced some sectors 
of the community while disenfranchising others, 
aptly captured in the central highlands expression 
‘those who eat and those who do not’ (Lakane and 
Gibbs 2003).
• Western Highlanders have come to accept 
that the spoils of office go, first, to the winning 
candidate and his campaign team, second, to his 
base vote area and, finally, to peripheral areas. 
The rationale for this probably lies in a primeval 
practice among kin-based societies where 
the successful hunter gets the first bite of the 
game meat.
• Rewards for the winning team may comprise 
jobs within the provincial government and its 
business entities, contracts for construction 
and maintenance of infrastructure, grants for 
agricultural and community development 
projects, and the delivery of services to their 
communities.
• The losing team watches, barely concealing its 
resentment, as the victors wallow in gluttony of 
all sorts. This process of selectively embracing 
small sectors of the community while 
disenfranchising the majority has been explored 
in the context of Engan politics, where not 
only do supporters of winning candidates gain 
government jobs, but known supporters of their 
rivals allegedly lose them (Lakane and Gibbs 
2003:103).
• Politics is gender biased in WHP. Very few 
women have stood in recent parliamentary 
elections: two in 2002, one in 2007 and none 
in 2012.
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Melanesian Governance Concepts
The contemporary focus on governance is com-
monly associated with the World Bank, following 
its reporting of a crisis of governance in sub-Saha-
ran Africa in 1989, and most Pacific Islanders often 
make the wrong assumption that it is a foreign 
concept. A close scrutiny of Pacific decision-mak-
ing processes, resource management practices and 
wealth disbursement customs indicate that good 
governance was an important feature of traditional 
Pacific societies (see McLeod 2008 for a review 
of Pacific leadership models). In fact, survival in 
these islands depended on good governance prac-
tices. For food, they took from the forests and the 
seas only what was required for their sustenance, 
thereby conserving stocks for future generations. 
Likewise, for construction material, they took sap-
lings for rafters and softwood for building canoes, 
while revering giant trees. In political and econom-
ic transactions, participation and consensus were 
important features of decision-making processes, 
while transparency, accountability and equity were 
the principles that governed wealth distribution in 
ceremonial exchanges, food sharing and pig cer-
emonials (where thousands of pigs were butchered, 
roasted in earth ovens, and the pork given away to 
exchange partners and other guests).
In Melanesia, it is the classic PNG highlands 
big-man model that captures all the important 
features of good governance. Big-man status was 
competitively acquired by excelling in ceremonial 
exchange, maintained by judiciously investing in 
social relations, and lost by neglecting exchange 
partners and followers. Note that nowadays 
parliamentary seats can be won, held, and lost 
in this way (see below). Here, it is appropriate 
to demonstrate how effective big-men exhibit 
elements of good governance in their dealings 
with fellow clansmen (followers) and people from 
outside the clan (potential followers).
At the sub-clan level, it is said that only true 
big-men can demonstrate master craftsmanship in 
cutting pork for distribution — without counting 
the number of people — and ensure that everyone 
receives a fair share. Big-men will not eat until 
everyone has had a portion of the meat. Women 
and children are served first, followed by men, 
and finally the distributors (a big-man and his 
assistants). Their own share is usually in the form 
of bones and pieces of skin and tiny scraps of meat 
that fall through the ferns and vegetables. Note the 
contrast between traditional big-men and their 
modern counterparts (parliamentarians); the latter 
feed themselves first.
At the clan level, big-men exercise great care 
in their transactions, because their leadership 
status demands transparency and accountability. It 
is instructive to look at how wealth is distributed 
by big-men. In Hagen society, the number of pigs 
received in moka is publicly declared in formal 
speeches (el ik) and witnessed by hundreds of 
people. The major recipient will in turn distribute 
the pigs in a public ceremony staged at the clan 
ceremonial ground (moka pena). His clansmen 
will know exactly how many pigs he has kept for 
himself. Whether they will support him in future 
enterprises depends on his generosity. So big-men 
tend to exercise considerable foresight, fairness and 
integrity in their dealings with their followers.
In its 2001 country report on PNG, the United 
Nations Country Team identified ‘transparency, 
accountability, participation, consensus, equity, 
efficiency, the rule of law, responsiveness and 
strategic vision’ as principles of good governance 
(UNCT 2001).
There are many examples from Melanesia and 
the rest of the South Pacific that demonstrate the 
application of good governance principles in the 
conduct of leaders and their people. This proves 
that good governance existed in this part of the 
world before the concept was made popular in 
the 1990s by the global financial and economic 
institutions (World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, World Trade Organization and Asian 
Development Bank).
In examining political governance and service 
delivery in PNG provinces, we can use these 
principles of good governance to determine whether 
state resources have been used by politicians and 
public servants to improve the living conditions of 
all men, women and children across the province 
or to enrich only a few well-connected individuals. 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm6                                                                                                                           State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
Joseph Ketan
Similarly, decisions taken by politicians and public 
servants regarding jobs and contracts can be 
examined in governance contexts to determine 
whether such decisions have been made in the 
broader interest of the public or merely to promote 
the narrow interests of a few people. Remedial 
actions taken on the basis of such analyses could 
prevent people from defrauding the state of 
millions of kina.
I shall now take a closer look at how WHP 
is governed by politicians and how resources are 
administered by public servants.
Political Structures and Funds
Under the provincial government system from 
1978 to 1995, provincial assembly members 
were directly elected by the voters, ministers 
were appointed by the premier, and the premier 
was elected by the provincial assembly from 
among the elected members (see Axline 1986; 
Conyers 1976; Standish 1979). The relationship 
between the national and provincial politicians 
was characterised by mutual distrust and 
animosity, whereby the national government 
regularly suspended provincial governments 
for mismanagement (see Ghai and Regan 1992; 
May and Regan 1997). The Wingti government, 
in particular, had a protracted history of 
confrontation with the WHPG headed by Premier 
Philip Kapal and dominated by his National Party 
(see Burton and Keher 1997; Ketan 2004).
The proclaimed theory behind the 1995 
provincial reforms legislated in the Organic 
Law on Provincial Government and Local-
Level Government (OLPGLLG) was that further 
decentralisation was required. The whole district 
and provincial structure was to be based on local-
level governments (LLGs). Council presidents 
were members of provincial assemblies until 
removed by an amendment of the OLPGLLG 
in 2006, which was only ruled unconstitutional 
in mid-2010. There are usually three LLGs per 
district — which is also an Open electorate — 
and usually about 10–30 councillors who each 
represent an LLG ward, which is the basic unit 
of all elections and electoral rolls. Before 1995, 
there had been one local government council per 
district, and mostly they had been progressively 
starved of resources since decentralisation in 1978. 
The new LLGs, under revised legislation, had to be 
built from scratch, both politically and physically, 
often with offices located in the strongholds of the 
then sitting members of parliament (MPs), but 
away from the social, economic and infrastructure 
nodes of the provinces, and completely detached 
from the district office. In practice, LLGs have 
had negligible funding and no dedicated staffing, 
with any executive tasks undertaken by the district 
administrator’s office.
Councils have some taxing rights but generally 
no capacity to collect taxes — that ceased around 
the time of national independence in 1975. They 
are meant to be funded by the national government, 
but that does not happen, except for a small grant 
which barely pays the councillors’ monthly meeting 
allowances, and they have lacked the skills to 
produce annual budgets. Councils can only thrive 
when strongly supported by the Open member, 
who may perceive them as potential rivals. Indeed, 
in many provinces over the past 15 years, MPs have 
manipulated the removal of council presidents to 
obtain someone they could control, both in the 
provincial assembly and the Joint District Planning 
and Budget Priorities Committee (JDPBPC). When 
it was learnt that districts would have K10 million 
DSIP funds, competition for the May 2008 council 
elections intensified and — especially in WHP — 
saw a rise of intimidation and ‘gifting’, with some 
violence reported. The 2013 elections for 22 LLGs 
in the highlands were failed by the Electoral 
Commissioner on the grounds of widespread fraud 
and violence.6 A significant point arising from the 
2013 LLG elections is that national ministers and 
MPs have supported candidates with millions of 
kina in attempting to build patron–client relations 
with LLG councillors, and cement their dominance. 
Despite that surge of interest, the LLGs and ward 
structures appear to be more significant on paper 
than they are as effective political forces driving the 
agendas of governance.
Nonetheless, LLG councillors remain the 
most accountable and transparent elective 
office holders in terms of their proximity to the 
people. It is for this reason that Governor Olga 
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tried to make them central to his planned Ward 
Development Program.7
The provincial government is headed by an 
elected governor, who chairs a provincial legislature, 
which is made up of Open members of the national 
parliament, presidents of LLGs, and appointed 
community representatives. The OLPGLLG 
provides for the elected provincial member to serve 
as governor and chair the provincial assembly, and 
for Open MPs to sit in the assembly. Provincial MPs 
with national roles such as minister, the speaker or 
opposition leader may not be governors as well, and 
in such cases an Open MP performs the role — as 
with Prime Minister Somare in East Sepik Province 
in the previous government.
Under the OLPGLLG, several core government 
functions, including extension services of the 
Department of Agriculture and Livestock, have 
been transferred to the provinces and districts. But 
the law does not hold the national government 
responsible for funding these functions under 
recurrent expenditure. Provincial governments 
are required by this law to pass on to districts 
and wards development grants from the national 
government, while, at the same time, they need 
to find ways to provide services at all levels. Most 
provinces have not received the required funds and 
so do not pass on the funds needed by lower levels 
simply because they do not have the money to fund 
all functions under the law (Whimp 2009).
National politicians and senior bureaucrats in 
Waigani are aware of the provincial governments’ 
financial predicament, yet they have effectively 
taken away from provincial governments a big 
chunk of the development budget and given it to 
districts, under the DSIP and sectoral grants, all 
to be allocated by JDPBPCs, which are basically 
controlled by Open MPs. Between 2007 and 2013 
a total of K36 million was allocated to each district 
via the Open MP, with a further K10 million 
pledged under the 2014 budget. This is a far cry 
from the early days when MPs had to make do with 
varied but often insignificant amounts of money, 
rising to K500,000 over many years until 2008, 
when the Somare government introduced the DSIP.
Elsewhere I have recorded the history of what 
are called ‘slush funds’ in PNG (Ketan 2007). 
Only a few words indicating the chronological 
changes in appropriations will suffice here. The 
Electoral Development Fund was established by 
the Somare government in 1984. Each MP was 
allocated K10,000 annually to spend at his or her 
discretion on any development project within 
his or her electorate. The value of the Electoral 
Development Fund increased considerably over 
the years — K100,000 in 1993, K300,000 in 1994, 
K550,000 in 1996 (Ketan 2007:6–7). Under the 
Skate government’s Rural Action Program, district 
support grants for the 89 Open MPs were increased 
to K1.5 million each while provincial support 
grants for the 20 provincial MPs were maintained 
at K500,000. The Morauta government reduced 
district support grants to K500,000 in 2000 under 
the Rural Improvement Program. The Somare 
government raised the amount to K10 million in 
2008 and K2 million in subsequent years from 2009 
to 2011 under the current DSIP.8 Separate funds 
are available to districts for education, health, and 
agriculture, administered by respective departments 
under sectoral programs.
Only K500,000 per annum in district support 
grants for each district is guaranteed by the 
constitution, while the rest of the development 
grants under the DSIP come under the national 
government’s rural development policy. Like any 
other government intervention program, the DSIP 
can be stopped and funding withdrawn at any time, 
so a new government (or even the current one) may 
decide to abolish funds such as the DSIP, or modify 
them and implement them under yet another new 
name. The Open MPs’ discretionary component of 
the district support grants is only K250,000, while 
the other half is administered by the JDPBPC. The 
latter is responsible for identifying, prioritising, 
selecting and approving projects for funding. These 
committees are not very effective and are mainly 
used as a rubber stamp for decisions unilaterally 
reached by Open MPs. The committees, chaired 
by the MP, comprise the LLG council presidents 
and appointees nominated by the Open MP, and 
their executive officer is the district administrator, 
who essentially owes his position to the MP. Often 
they meet outside the district and even outside 
the province.
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Governors have at least K1 million each at 
their disposal, under both discretionary and 
non-discretionary components of the provincial 
support grants, which is much less than the total 
funds available to Open MPs. This situation has 
forced many governors to seek funding elsewhere, 
including contestable funds from the National 
Planning Department.
The intention of the 1995 organic law was 
to ensure greater levels of cooperation between 
politicians at all levels of government; to 
strengthen links between local, provincial and 
national governments; and to facilitate the pooling 
of resources through integrated planning and 
budgeting to achieve common development goals. 
But the reformed provincial government system 
is clearly not working, as politicians compete for 
kudos in the disbursement of development grants.
Generally, governors exercise effective power 
over the appointment of senior public servants, 
chief executive officers of government entities, 
the governor’s own support staff, and consultants. 
They have a say in the awarding of contracts for 
construction and maintenance of infrastructure 
and for the provision of goods and services. 
They also have influence over the disbursement 
of development grants and discretionary funds. 
By law, all of these decisions are supposed to be 
taken by appropriate committees (the Provincial 
Executive Council, Provincial Tenders Board, 
Provincial Planning and Budget Priorities 
Committee), but in practice governors can, and do, 
take decisions unilaterally and have them endorsed 
by committees at subsequent meetings.
Box 1: Office of Rural Development
In 2010 the statutory agency responsible for administering the DSIP funds, the Office of Rural 
Development (ORD), revealed that no MP had received the full amount of DSIP since its 
establishment in 2008. Most districts do not have the personnel with necessary skills to complete 
the documentation required for drawing down DSIP funds. The ORD provides K300,000 to each 
Open MP to facilitate the release of project funds. Rather than hiring consultants to prepare project 
documentation so that DSIP funds can be released for development activities, most MPs have opted 
to use the inexpert services of wantoks, whose amateurish product is regularly rejected out of hand 
by technical screening committees. Governors face similar problems attempting to draw down 
development funds.
Surely someone in the top echelons of government knows that not all funds allocated to the 
provinces and districts under national budgets will be released in any given year. Most MPs, however, 
are never told that it would be unthinkable to release all funds at once, simply because there is 
not enough money to honour all commitments to provinces and districts, and even if there was 
enough money, the consequences would be disastrous for the small economies. To use a central 
highlands analogy, the big-man has yet to kill his pig, but he has already pledged the forequarters and 
hindquarters to four individuals. MPs would do themselves a favour by using this analogy to explain 
to their constituents that the prime minister has made a pledge (in handing down the budget), but the 
actual transfers will be made later, subject to ORD financial management guidelines.
Some MPs, as indicated by ORD Director, Paul Saii, have circumvented DSIP guidelines by going 
directly to the Finance Department to pick up their cheques without proper clearance from ORD. In 
accordance with ORD guidelines, cheques for subsequent years should only be released to MPs (or can 
now be transferred directly to district treasuries) upon certification of completed projects and financial 
reports. The certificates of acquittal are then transferred to both the Ombudsman Commission for 
clearance under the Leadership Code and also to the Finance Department (as required under the 
Financial Management Act). In the past, prime ministers Somare and O’Neill have on occasion waived 
acquittal requirements for MPs who had failed to acquit previous funds.
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Olga Administration
At the time of drafting this paper, the provincial 
government was headed by Governor Tom 
Olga, a former student activist who was expelled 
from the University of Papua New Guinea for 
leading the 2001 students strike over the Morauta 
government’s privatisation policy.9 In 2007 the 
relatively unknown Olga caused a major surprise 
in PNG politics by unseating a former prime 
minister and governor, Paias Wingti, reputedly one 
of the wealthiest men in the South Pacific. Wingti 
challenged the election results in the Court of 
Disputed Returns, but Olga emerged victorious. A 
protracted court battle saw him temporarily ousted 
as MP by the national court — although retaining 
his governorship through a technicality — and 
finally he was reinstated by the Supreme Court 
after two recounts.
In the 2007 election the Wingti team comprised 
wealthy businessmen, coffee growers and 
traditional big-men with oratorical skills. This is 
the political establishment, the aristocracy of WHP 
politics, which presides over the ‘political kingdom’ 
(Ottaway 1995). The organisation was built over 
many years by mixing politics with business. It has 
a strong following in Hagen Central, with pockets 
of support from other districts. Even members 
of Tom Olga’s own Nengka tribe are members of 
Wingti’s team.
By contrast, Olga’s campaign team was made 
up of young orators with neither money nor 
professional background. Political life was not 
easy for the young governor. Considered by the 
establishment as an outsider, from what Hagen 
Central people call ‘the back pages’ of the province, 
Olga had his work cut out for him. He knew that 
he could not count on the sincerity of Hagen 
Central leaders, so he sought the assistance of 
genuine professionals from the peripheral areas of 
the province. The core of his support base is made 
up of young untainted leaders from all corners of 
the province.
Despite their contrasting support bases, Olga 
and Wingti share some common characteristics. 
Both men left the University of Papua New Guinea 
before completing their studies, had no money of 
their own before entering politics, and probably 
owe almost everything they have to political office. 
Both have forceful personalities, regularly dominate 
meetings, and tend to make decisions without 
much consultation. Both are charismatic leaders, 
can captivate audiences with public oratory (aimed 
mainly at people’s emotions rather than their 
intellect), and are capable of marshalling resources 
by using persuasive skills.
While the rivalry between Olga and Wingti 
is real, and at times almost erupted into violent 
armed conflict, not many on either side are aware 
that Tom Olga is considered by his confidantes 
as Paias Wingti’s son. Olga admires Wingti and 
wants to emulate the remarkable achievements of 
his mentor.10
In any case, Governor Olga argued that there 
is no opposition in WHP. Indeed, he ignored 
political party affiliations when allocating provincial 
government roles to national MPs. In his first 
provincial executive council (2007–2009), Hon 
Benjamin Mul (MP for North Wahgi) and Hon 
Puri Ruing (MP for Dei) held portfolios (committee 
chairs) in the provincial government, while sitting 
in the Opposition front benches at the national 
level, by virtue of their membership of Mekere 
Morauta’s PNG Party — the successor to Wingti’s 
People’s Democratic Movement.11
Governor Olga and Sani Rambi (then MP for 
Mul-Baiyer) are members of Sir Michael Somare’s 
National Alliance Party. Although Olga contested 
the elections as an independent candidate, he 
immediately followed his Nengka tribesmen to 
the National Alliance camp in Kokopo, partly 
because Rambi and his wife paid for some of his 
election expenses, but also because Olga could 
not see himself working with Morauta, whose 
government policies he had vehemently opposed 
during the 2001 University of Papua New Guinea 
student unrest.
As in other provinces, the WHP political 
structures can create divisions among MPs. Olga 
maintained warm relations with all Open MPs, 
except probably one who tried, and failed, to wrestle 
the governorship from him during his court battle 
with Wingti. But the governor was not successful 
in maintaining cohesion within the group of MPs 
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from the province. Perhaps naively, he thought at 
the inception of his tenure that he could convince 
his parliamentary colleagues to form a united 
front, with a view to extracting resources from 
the national government. Open MPs consider 
themselves as fund managers and service providers, 
rather than legislators, and their tenure depends 
on how well or how poorly they perform in these 
areas. They totally dominate the JDPBPCs, which 
they chair, control the DSIP funds as if they own 
them, and ignore the ORD financial guidelines.
Despite these divisions, Governor Olga 
did have potent symbols of nationalism in the 
province’s best known cultural and natural heritage 
properties — the Kuk early agricultural site and the 
Baiyer River Birds Sanctuary — that he could use 
as a rallying point for provincial and national unity. 
These are the kind of large-scale enterprises that 
can influence people to rise above parochialism. 
The late governor Father Robert Lak recognised 
the significance of these assets and he and his 
provincial administrator, Dr Thomas Webster, 
worked hard to help develop and promote these 
properties nationally and internationally. In 1999, 
Lak led a team of 42 LLG councillors to Port 
Moresby where they met with officials to discuss 
ways to promote the Kuk and the Baiyer heritage 
properties. The councillors also met with the 
MPs from WHP at the national parliament. Lak’s 
government played a significant part in getting 
Kuk included on the World Heritage List. His 
government paid for the writing and publication of 
a national heritage management book (Ketan and 
Muke 2001) and also contributed funds towards the 
preparation of the nomination document for Kuk.
The momentum, however, died with Father 
Lak’s defeat by Paias Wingti in 2002. Thereafter the 
Wingti government, while focused on rehabilitating 
the coffee industry, showed little interest in heritage 
matters. The Olga government showed some 
interest in developing heritage properties, but failed 
to gain support from Open MPs. A demonstration 
of national leadership in championing such projects 
of international significance could win the respect 
of even the most ardent political rivals. But no 
governor seems to have had the foresight to back 
these projects wholeheartedly.
To be fair to Governor Olga, his government 
had identified the development of heritage 
properties, together with the upgrading of 
Kagamuga airport and the reconstruction of 
the provincial headquarters building, as priority 
‘impact’ projects. Even though some funds had 
been allocated towards the development of these 
projects, the lack of tangible evidence concerned 
Olga supporters.
Governor Olga was led to believe that his 
funding problems would be alleviated as a direct 
result of intervention from Prime Minister Somare, 
who announced at Mount Hagen on 18 October 
2010, when launching the Mount Hagen City 
Redevelopment Plan, that the Olga government 
would receive K125 million in Public Investment 
Program funds.12 That amount was a small portion 
of what Olga had requested for impact projects 
through his integrated provincial development 
plan. Somare had been exceptionally receptive 
to Governor Olga not only because both men 
belonged to the National Alliance Party, but because 
Sir Michael feared Paias Wingti more than any 
other political opponent. Somare still remembers 
the times when Wingti outmanoeuvred him, first 
in 1985 by ousting him in a parliamentary vote of 
no confidence, and second, after the 1987 election, 
by coming from behind to beat him in forming 
the government when Somare’s team appeared 
to have had the required numbers. Thus national 
and personal affairs can profoundly influence 
provincial matters.
Provincial Administration
In 2012 the province had not had a substantively 
appointed provincial administrator for over 
12 years. Since the mid-term departure of 
Dr Thomas Webster in 2000, Michael Wandil 
served as acting provincial administrator for 
eight years under three different governors: Lak 
(two years), Wingti (five years) and Olga (one year). 
Olga replaced Wandil with Malcolm Culligan 
in 2009. Culligan served as acting provincial 
administrator for nearly four years (2009–12). 
There seems to be no plan for a more permanent 
(substantive) appointment. Politicians clearly feel 
more comfortable with acting administrators than 
ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm                                                                                                 11 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2013/9
with permanent ones because it gives them more 
control over public servants. That happens at the 
top of national government departments as well. 
Paias Wingti deliberately kept Wandil on an acting 
basis for a full five-year term. Tom Olga made no 
serious attempt to rectify that situation.
Acting appointees are susceptible to 
manipulation when faced with an uncertain future. 
Administrators, hoping to work their way into 
securing their positions, often start well, giving 
good advice and implementing government 
policies, but they soon get disillusioned when 
they realise that governors have no intention 
of making substantive appointments. Almost 
inevitably, their performance level drops. 
Under such circumstances, it would be fair to 
conclude that administrators who have yet to 
secure their positions rarely perform their duties 
with a high degree of competence, often fail to 
inspire compliance and commitment from their 
subordinates, and may even actively work against 
governors. All public servants in WHP are on 
acting positions. They have been serving in that 
capacity for nine years. This has resulted in low 
morale and poor work performance.
The provincial bureaucracy has not performed 
its statutory functions. It is deficient in crucial 
areas of corporate governance:
Management — In 2010 the Office of the 
Provincial Administrator lost control over 
planning, budgeting, disbursement of development 
grants and internal revenue, and the management 
of impact projects. These functions were performed 
by the Office of the Governor, via consultants and 
casual staff. Communication between the two 
offices has often broken down, with the governor 
blaming the administrator for failing to implement 
his policies, and the administrator complaining 
about political interference in administrative 
matters. The relationship between public servants 
and casual staff from the governor’s office was 
characterised by mutual distrust and antagonism.
Planning — Each sector or division is capable 
of coming up with plans, but the difficulty is 
integrating these to form a cohesive whole, then 
linking them to the various national development 
plans. The province has always had a competent 
planning unit but in recent years the head of 
the unit turned to private business after being 
underutilised for many years. His energies, however, 
were rejuvenated after he was promoted to deputy 
administrator and became actively involved in 
drafting the provincial integrated development 
plan 2011–2015. Implementation of the plan is the 
key. This is where the administration has failed 
numerous times in the past.
Budget control — It is worrying to note that 
spending in WHP on ‘unspecified arrears’ increased 
over the three years 2007–2009. The NEFC has 
expressed concern that ‘some provinces [like 
WHP] are allocating and spending money under 
generic budget descriptions such as arrears, aged 
[sic] creditors, debt servicing, contingencies, 
multipurpose, etc’, which conceals the purpose 
of the expenditure (NEFC 2010:101). WHP ran 
up a big debt over those three years as political 
supporters celebrated their electoral victory and 
public servants served themselves while Governor 
Olga was engaged in the court battles with Paias 
Wingti. By 2010 the domestic debt had been 
reduced to K1 million. Genuine service providers 
have still not been paid for vehicle hire, hotels and 
other services, while huge sums of money have been 
spent on administration and consultancy services 
(including K6 million on the Mount Hagen City 
Redevelopment Plan).
Service delivery — The Office of the Provincial 
Administrator is ultimately responsible for ensuring 
that services are delivered equitably across all 
districts. It has failed to perform this most crucial 
function over the years.
The WHP bureaucracy lacks cohesion, 
generally operates in a disjointed manner, and is 
incapable of delivering services evenly across the 
province. Public service and financial management 
regulations are not strictly enforced. Absenteeism is 
high, productivity is low, interagency links are poor, 
the standard of planning is deplorable, and the level 
of service delivery is disgraceful (Ketan and Olga 
2008:41).
Clearly, there is a need for a major restructuring 
of the bureaucracy. Such an exercise should 
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be aimed at addressing the apparent lack of 
intellectual depth in the province. The problem can 
be resolved in the short term through hiring skilled 
technocrats and innovative thinkers on short-term 
contracts, acquiring the services of technical people 
from donor agencies, and in the long term through 
the recruitment and training of bright young 
university graduates through a graduate cadet 
scheme. The short-term technocrats and foreign 
aid development experts could work in partnership 
with the cadet officers in mentor–protégé relations. 
This would help create the core of the next 
generation of senior public servants who would be 
dedicated, skilled and untainted by corruption.
Education Services
WHP does exceptionally well in the area of 
education. For several years, WHP maintained 
its second-place position to the National Capital 
District in Year 12 intake at universities. In 2011, 
WHP had more Year 12 students admitted to 
universities than any other province in PNG. WHP 
has many important educational institutions, 
including 15 high schools, 7 vocational schools 
and 3 colleges (teachers, nursing and agriculture), 
as well as an international high school and 
a university centre. In addition, there are 
15 Christian theological and leadership training 
colleges, which attract students from different parts 
of the country. Despite considerable progress made 
in the area of education, the WHPG continues to 
give education low priority in budget allocations. 
NEFC reports suggest that WHP needs to spend 
more money on education (see discussion below on 
Recurrent Expenditure in Core MTDS Areas).
Health Services
The province has a referral hospital in Mount 
Hagen, as well as three Christian mission–run 
hospitals in the districts (including the popular 
Kudjip Nazarene Hospital near Minj, which is 
now in Jiwaka Province). These hospitals conduct 
health extension services, often combining 
immunisation clinics with other health programs 
to maximise use of limited resources. Primary 
health care is provided in the districts at health 
centres, while first aid treatment is given at aid 
posts. WHP has 55 active health centres (and one 
closed): 38 operated by Christian missions and 
18 by the provincial government. The provincial 
government also manages 109 aid posts (16 of 
which are currently closed). The aid posts, however, 
are poorly resourced, and many more would have 
been shut down had it not been for the ingenuity 
of aid post orderlies who keep things running by 
purchasing the bulk of their medical supplies from 
the private sector (probably from government 
stores at hospitals) and then charge their patients 
a small fee for their services. The delivery of 
health services in WHP is inadequate, with only 
modest improvement in health indicators. NEFC 
reports indicate that the WHPG does not spend 
enough money on health (see discussion below on 
Recurrent Expenditure in Core MTDS Areas).
Economy
The economy of the province is predominantly 
based on agriculture: coffee production for the 
export market and cultivation of food crops in 
small gardens for the local market. The Wahgi 
Valley is the major agricultural region of the 
province. A number of large coffee and tea 
plantations are located in the middle Wahgi 
region, which became part of Jiwaka Province 
in 2012. WHP lost a big chunk of its land to the 
new province, together with people, resources 
and capital assets.13 The reduction in landmass, 
population and assets will inevitably lead to a 
reduction in WHP’s revenue. The loss may well 
be insignificant, however, because the provincial 
government does not directly earn money from 
coffee production in the province.
WHP may even gain from the creation of 
Jiwaka Province, as it will no longer be required 
to meet the high cost of service delivery to the 
remote Jimi and Kambia regions, which produce 
little revenue. Of course, any significant reduction 
in the cost of service delivery could be used as 
the basis by the national government for reducing 
grants to the province after 2012. Revenue for 
WHP should be maintained at realistic levels to 
maintain services, while Jiwaka needs to be funded 
at appropriate levels for establishment costs (capital 
investment) and for service delivery. Assuming that 
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WHP agrees and is funded, it could assist with the 
task of nurturing the new province, and continue to 
provide some services to the people of Jiwaka after 
2012 on an agency basis, until relevant milestones 
for the new province are fully met.
Crime, conflict and poor roads threaten 
the future of both coffee and tea industries. As 
mentioned, the Wahgi Valley’s plantation economy 
almost collapsed as coffee estates closed down 
in the 1990s because of years of widespread 
mismanagement, gun warfare, labour shortage, 
poor roads, crime and the high cost of security. 
While deteriorating roads, crime and the high 
cost of security contributed to the abandonment 
of plantations, the withdrawal of labourers 
from Southern Highlands and Enga provinces, 
attracted home by mining and petroleum projects 
there, created a mini Dutch disease that severely 
affected the coffee sector. Contested ownership 
and subsequent warfare, especially after alleged 
mismanagement, then forced many plantations and 
factories to shut down. In an earlier study, I noted 
that the disruptive power struggles were not only 
a threat to the viability of plantations, but would 
also lead to the dismantling of the coalition-style 
alliances (business development associations) 
that own the plantations (Ketan 2004: Chapter 4). 
Failure to address the issues of intergenerational 
power struggles, mismanagement, and ownership 
claims erupted into armed conflict, resulting 
in numerous deaths, the displacement of large 
populations, and huge loss of income.
While some plantations have recently been 
revived with grants from the national government 
under the coffee rehabilitation program, ownership 
over Gumanch and Waghi Mek plantations remains 
contested by rival local groups. Before the closure 
of the plantations, the WHPG estimated that the 
province was the country’s largest coffee producer, 
accounting for 46 per cent of the nation’s annual 
production. The province then had 150 coffee 
plantations and 55,900 household growers (with 
an average of 1,200 coffee trees each), all capable 
of producing around 16,165 tonnes of quality 
Arabica coffee annually. Potential export income 
for coffee was estimated at K60 million annually 
(WHPG 1999:11–12). In the current coffee boom, 
that figure will have risen considerably, and benefit 
Jiwaka Province, although most of the essential 
support and service industries are located in Mount 
Hagen town.
The once-thriving livestock industry also 
suffered losses, as cattle ranches in the Baiyer and 
Jimi valleys closed down because of impassable 
roads, crime and conflict. Semi-wild cattle now 
roam freely in the Baiyer–Ruti area, where visitors 
with cash in hand are allowed by the provincial 
government to shoot cattle at K500 per head.
Pigs are widely raised by all families in the 
province, but there are only a few commercial 
piggeries. The current rate for an average-sized pig 
is K1,000 while a fully grown boar will cost as much 
as K3,000. Some pigs are sold to pay school fees each 
year, but most are used in irregular events such as 
ceremonial exchanges, bridewealth, compensation, 
election hospitality, and pig ceremonials.
There are no large chicken farms in WHP, but 
there is a growing demand for poultry products. The 
demand for fresh chicken is met by locally produced 
chickens raised in small huts and sold at K25 per 
head, while the demand for frozen chicken is met by 
big national companies operating out of Lae.
New industries such as fisheries (carp and 
tilapia), locally sewn garments (laplap and meri 
blaus) and artefacts (axes and bilums) offer some 
income-earning opportunities in the informal 
economy, but these are only small in scale.
Although WHP has no verified oil reserves 
or mineral deposits (except for small amounts of 
alluvial gold at Mt Kuta near Mount Hagen, and 
Kurunga in Dei district), the province stands to 
benefit from the multimillion dollar liquefied 
natural gas project in Hela Province through spin-
off businesses, especially in transport, hospitality 
and retail industries. Indeed, WHP businessmen 
and farmers are already taking advantage of 
opportunities provided by the mineral and 
petroleum development projects in Enga and Hela 
provinces by providing goods and services. Trucking 
and vehicle hire companies are making fortunes, 
while fresh food producers and retailers are earning 
good income through sales in project areas, where 
the demand for food and fuel is high. Overall, 
much of the economy ticks over without creating 
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much provincial government revenue or much 
government intervention, despite the crucial need 
for improved infrastructure.
Revenue Sources
The WHPG has a relatively small internal revenue 
base, even though the province contributes signifi-
cantly to national income through export crops, 
and thus relies mainly on annual national govern-
ment grants to fund its operations. Each of the 
seven Open MPs has had K36 million (see under 
Political Structures and Funds) which could be 
accessed under the DSIP, but they have shown little 
interest in supporting provincial government initia-
tives, which, in their view, will only generate pres-
tige for the governor. The WHPG generates much 
of its revenue from liquor licensing, retail tax, 
motor vehicle registration, and from investments in 
real estate and coffee management companies. The 
provincial cash cow, Melpa Properties Limited, pro-
vides local politicians with money for pork-barrel 
politics, while the Western Highlands Engineering 
Unit has been used by some as a vehicle for trans-
ferring money from public to private pockets.
Provincial sources of revenue include:
• Melpa Properties Limited, a real estate company 
owned by the WHPG, now managed by 
Western Highlands Development Corporation, 
has not paid any dividend in the past three 
years, although we do know that it owns 
properties, that it does make money, and that 
some of the money has been used by politicians 
and others outside the provincial budget.
• Motor Vehicle Registry and Licensing provides 
a growing source of income for the province 
and has the potential to generate much more if 
managed properly.
• Provincial liquor licensing could generate much 
more money than it currently does, if licensing 
were effectively policed and revenue collected in 
a timely manner.
• Retail tax remitted from the Internal Revenue 
Commission is the major source of internal 
revenue for the province.
• Gambling is popular but difficult to tax and, 
curiously, the province has failed to register 
income from this source in the past three years.
In 2009, the WHPG generated K14.9 million 
from internal revenue, including K11.5 million 
from Goods and Services Tax, and K2 million 
from motor vehicle and public motor vehicle 
registration. The province collected K200,000 
from liquor licensing, well below what it actually 
should generate. Note that the WHPG did not 
receive any dividend from Melpa Properties in 
2009. Likewise, it did not receive any money from 
Bookmakers Tax.
The NEFC indicated that WHP does not 
spend enough money from internal revenue on 
core MTDS areas. It shows that internal revenue 
spending on services declined significantly since 
2007. The province spent almost K4 million from 
internal revenue on services in 2007, followed by 
zero expenditure in 2008, and about K3.6 million in 
2009 (NEFC 2010:24, Graph 6). A large percentage 
of internal revenue is believed to be used outside 
the contexts of the public financial management 
system (probably listed under Unspecified Arrears 
in expenditure reports).
A previous WHPG sold off the provincial 
government’s shares in Ramu Sugar and gave 
away investments in coffee estates. The holding 
company, Arabica Coffee Limited, is managed by 
an expatriate, while the plantations, though revived 
with provincial government funds under its coffee 
rehabilitation program, are now controlled by 
individuals. Attempts by the Olga government to 
recover money from such sales were not successful, 
while the general manager of Melpa Properties 
has been instructed by the WHPG to prepare 
documents to be used in court proceedings against 
the owners of the plantations.
Under Governor Olga the WHPG identified 
deficiencies in revenue collection methods and 
hired a consultant to design strategies to improve 
the system. In April 2011, Melpa Properties 
Limited had not produced audited financial reports 
for the previous three years, despite requests from 
the Office of the Governor.
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Recurrent Expenditure in Core Medium Term 
Development Strategy Areas
The NEFC reviews on provincial government 
expenditure (2005–2009) identified several key 
development issues that required immediate 
government attention. The general points raised by 
the NEFC (2007, 2008) are that there is a funding 
gap between fiscal capacity and cost of services; 
there is a priority gap between fiscal capacity and 
expenditure; and the current level of spending on 
recurrent goods and services in priority areas is 
inadequate. A further point made by the NEFC 
is that ‘over recent years the combined impact of 
population growth and inflation has meant that 
the cost of delivering services has risen at a faster 
rate than the corresponding increase in revenues 
available to provinces’, under the reformed 
intergovernmental financing arrangements 
(NEFC 2010:18).
With respect to fiscal capacity, WHP has at 
its disposal only 68 per cent of what it needs to 
perform its essential roles. In other words, the 
province has a budget shortfall of 32 per cent 
required to fund core services. The funding gap 
is caused by high cost of services and low levels 
of funding (quite apart from high ‘administrative 
costs’, which come under the ‘priority gap’ label and 
exceed fiscal capacity).
The funding gap is being partly addressed 
by the national government through the 
implementation of the reformed intergovernmental 
financing arrangements, although the combined 
impact of population growth and inflation has 
outstripped increase in revenues (as noted above). 
To achieve financial autonomy, the WHPG will 
need to invest in agriculture and downstream 
processing in order to expand its internal 
revenue base.
An examination of provincial government 
expenditure from 2005 to 2009, based on NEFC 
reports (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), indicates 
how the province performs in crucial areas of 
service delivery.
Administration
Despite its limited fiscal capacity, WHP spends 
too much money on administration, leaving little 
for priority areas. The NEFC estimated that the 
annual cost of services for administration should 
be K1.879 million (NEFC 2010:117). The province, 
however, has consistently overspent. According 
to the NEFC expenditure review for 2005–2009, 
the largest amount spent on administration was 
K7.808 million — 415.5 per cent — in 2008. In 
2009 it was K7.367 million. The priority gap can be 
reduced by cutting back on administrative spending, 
reducing and controlling spending on low priority 
areas (projects and casual wages), and spending 
more on core MTDS areas.
Education
The NEFC (2010) estimated that it would cost the 
WHPG around K7.096 million annually to deliver 
educational services across the province. The 
minimum priority activities in education identified 
by the NEFC are: (1) provision of school materials, 
(2) supervision by district and provincial officers, 
and (3) operation of district education offices. In 
2009, the WHPG allocated K2.729 million (38.5 per 
cent) to education activities. This is a significant 
increase from previous years: 15 per cent in 2008, 
18 per cent in 2007, 8 per cent in 2006, and 21 per 
cent in 2005. Spending less than 40 per cent of what 
the province needs to spend on education is not 
good enough for a province that takes pride in the 
development of human resources. The important 
role of the Christian missions in the delivery 
of educational services becomes clearer in this 
context. The main churches (Catholic, Lutheran, 
Seventh-day Adventists) operate 132 primary 
schools (compared with 54 government primary 
schools), seven high schools (eight government), 
five vocational schools (two government), and 
numerous post-secondary colleges (including the 
Holy Trinity Teachers College, the Kudjip Nursing 
College, the multidenominational Christian Leaders 
Training College, and various denominational bible 
colleges and seminaries).
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Health
The NEFC (2010) estimated the annual cost of 
health services in WHP to be K4.166 million. 
The minimum priority activities in health are: (1) 
operation of rural health facilities, (2) integrated 
health outreach patrols, and (3) drug distribution. 
In 2009 the WHPG spent K1.833 million on 
health, which is 44 per cent of what it needs to 
spend on the delivery of health services. This is 
the highest amount recorded within the five-year 
period covered by the NEFC review. Figures for 
previous years were 21 per cent in 2008, 24 per cent 
in 2007, 20 per cent in 2006, and 28 per cent in 
2005. Health is crucial for social development, but 
the low priority given by the WHPG suggests that 
it is not serious about providing primary health 
care — including tackling the HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
sexually transmitted diseases, and other diseases 
— for its citizens. The province would have been 
in serious trouble had it not been for the Christian 
missions, which provide vital health services across 
the province through 38 health centres (compared 
with 18 government), including Kudjip Nazarene 
Hospital (now in Jiwaka Province), Kotna Lutheran 
Hospital and Tinsley Baptist Hospital.
Infrastructure Maintenance
This is the most expensive of all sectors. The 
NEFC (2010) estimated that it would cost 
around K15.080 million per annum to provide 
infrastructure maintenance services across 
WHP. The minimum priority activities in 
transport infrastructure are road, bridge and 
airstrip maintenance. In 2009, the WHPG spent 
K4.557 million on transport infrastructure, 
just 30 per cent of what it needs to spend. This 
represents an increase from 2008 of 15 per cent, 
although it is not near previous years: 36 per 
cent in 2007 and 52 per cent in 2006. The higher 
expenditure in 2006 and 2007 is the result of 
K6 million worth of contracts awarded to local 
construction companies for the upgrading of roads 
in the province. The expenditure follows a typical 
pattern whereby governments (and MPs) spend 
more money at the end of the year — and at the 
end of their tenure — rather than at the beginning 
and middle periods. Correspondingly, roads 
improve in the fourth and fifth years of the election 
cycle, only to fall into disrepair after the elections.
Agriculture
The NEFC (2010) estimated that the cost of 
services in agriculture is K1.785 million annually. 
The province has neglected this most important 
area. Agriculture funds have gone mainly towards 
the rehabilitation of coffee plantations (mostly 
operated by cronies of politicians). Extension, 
marketing and other key aspects of agriculture 
have been neglected by the WHPG for many 
years. The industry has survived because of local 
entrepreneurial and survival skills.
Village Courts
The NEFC (2010) estimated that the annual cost 
of services for village courts is K0.485 million for 
allowances and a further K0.259 for operational 
costs. The provincial government allocated more 
money in this sector over the review period, 
but what is not clear from the review is the 
appropriation figures for village courts, peace 
mediators, land mediators, and other frontline law 
and order people (officials and community leaders). 
The WHPG allocated K1 million for law and order 
in its 2011 budget, but that is inadequate to fund all 
its operations in this most crucial MTDS area.
Evaluation I: How Did the Olga Government 
Perform?
This concluding section evaluates the performance 
of the Olga government in the areas of governance 
and service delivery. It is fair to say that Tom 
Olga had no experience in management or 
administration before becoming governor of 
the province. Furthermore, he did not possess 
the relevant academic qualifications usually 
required for coordinating the complex activities 
of government business. What he did have was 
leadership skills: the ability to coordinate large-
scale enterprises involving hundreds of people, 
large sums of money and other resources.
Olga also had the exuberance of youth and 
enthusiasm for learning about the business of 
governance. He recognised that the best way 
to learn about development planning, policy 
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formulation, budgeting, governance and service 
delivery was to involve himself in these processes. 
Soon after taking office in August 2007, Governor 
Olga initiated a review of government operations 
in the province. The review was to provide the 
WHPG with baseline data with which to plan for 
the future.
The review found that the province was 
suffering from serious political and economic 
governance, and administrative, problems. The 
problems ranged from ad hoc decision-making to 
poor investments, with no regard for accountability 
of public funds. The findings of the review were 
published in a policy paper (Ketan and Olga 2008). 
The major problems identified by the review are 
discussed below.
• The WHPG had been operating for many years 
without a strategic plan, a vision statement, or 
clearly articulated policy documents. To rectify 
this situation, the Olga government dedicated 
its first year to assessment and planning, which 
resulted in the release of several planning 
documents: a Governor’s Vision Statement 
containing policy directives and a corporate 
plan (Bruce and Temon 2009; Ketan and Olga 
2008). Next, the government established the 
Provincial Coordination and Monitoring 
Committee to coordinate the delivery of 
services within the province. This committee 
draws membership from all stakeholders, 
including civil society.
• In 2010, the Olga government became the first 
provincial government in PNG to deliver its 
integrated development plan to the national 
government. The Western Highlands Integrated 
Development Plan 2011–2015 aligned the 
Olga government’s development goals with 
the national government’s PNG Development 
Strategic Plan 2010–2030 as well as with the 
PNG National Strategic Plan 2010–2050 
(commonly known as the PNG Vision 2050 
roadmap).
• Provincial administrators acted in that position 
for 12 years, from 2000 to 2012. Michael Wandil 
held the post of provincial administrator in 
an acting capacity for almost 9 years (2000–
2008). The Olga government did not rectify this 
situation by making a substantive appointment. 
Wandil’s successor, Malcolm Culligan, was acting 
provincial administrator for almost four years.
• All public servants in the province have been on 
acting positions since 2002 (and still are to this 
date). That is nine years without job security. 
As Governor Olga said in jest, ‘They should 
be in Hollywood’. Yet, this is unacceptable. 
Low morale and poor performance have been 
attributed to this situation. The Department of 
Personnel Management finally responded to the 
Olga government’s request for all positions to be 
formalised. But positions have to be advertised 
so that substantive appointments can be made, 
all of which takes many months.
• Inherent financial management problems 
(lack of control, absence of internal audits, 
non-compliance with the Public Finance 
Management Act) were identified within the 
provincial administration. This has led to the 
theft of public funds in millions of kina (mainly 
through fraudulent claims). These problems have 
yet to be rectified. Governor Olga brought this 
matter to the attention of officials in Waigani, 
but he admitted that it would require profound 
reforms in the areas of financial management as 
well as in personnel management to rectify these 
problems.
• Too many people were employed as casual staff 
within the provincial administration as well as 
with provincial government–owned entities 
(approximately 150 persons in provincial 
government, 50 in Melpa Properties, 30 in 
Western Highlands Engineering Limited, 20 in 
Office of Traffic Registry, 20 in Pacific Arabica). 
The Olga government reduced the number of 
casual staff, but there are still too many casual 
staff on the public payroll.14
• The WHPG operated for many years without an 
asset management system. The Olga government 
established an Asset Register and Database to 
prevent further theft of government assets.
• In 2007 the province was in very bad shape, as 
exemplified by deteriorating transport and social 
infrastructure, run-down coffee plantations, 
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declining social indicators, increasing conflict 
and social instability, and serious governance 
problems. The Olga government, in collaboration 
with Open MPs, made some progress in 
upgrading major roads. The Hagen–Baiyer Road 
and the Kotna–Banz Road were sealed, thanks in 
part to contributions from Open MPs, but also 
because of Asian Development Bank counterpart 
funding put aside by the Wingti government. But 
there is much more work to be done: all roads 
within the province need to be rehabilitated to 
previous levels. With respect to declining social 
indicators, conflict and social instability, the 
Olga government had planned to address these 
issues through the Ward Development Program 
(see endnote 6). Agriculture and governance, 
although key issues in the Governor’s Vision 
Statement (Ketan and Olga 2008), seem to have 
been neglected again.
• Successive governments and the public service 
have failed to deliver basic services to the 
people. The NEFC reports indicate that the Olga 
government, like its predecessors, did not deliver 
services evenly across the province.
• Public expenditure programs have not resulted 
in any tangible development within the province. 
The Olga government planned for developing 
the Kagamuga Airport precinct (including air-
port upgrading, stadium, township), the pro-
vincial headquarters complex, a city bypass for 
heavy trucks, the Mount Hagen Water Supply 
(to be sourced from Mount Ambra), City Waste 
Treatment and Disposal System, the Baiyer River 
Birds Sanctuary, and the Kuk World Heritage 
property. Governor Olga liked to promote grand 
plans, but seemed to have forgotten his promise 
to do small things properly before embarking 
on bigger and complex projects. He planned to 
build a provincial headquarters complex that 
could have cost over a hundred million kina. It 
would have been better to build a simple one 
for K20 million at the time (rather than a grand 
one later).
In terms of good governance practices, the Olga 
administration performed adequately, but clearly 
more needed to be done.
In terms of service delivery, the Olga 
government performed poorly. The provincial 
administrator has considerable responsibility for 
this failure although, as demonstrated, many of the 
problems of governance are deeply engrained.
NEFC Chairman, Nao Badu, advised Governor 
Olga to use the NEFC cost of services study, 
as justification, to draw down funds from the 
Department of National Planning and Monitoring 
to deliver services and to rehabilitate infrastructure 
before June 2012, but Olga ignored that advice. Had 
he taken the NEFC advice seriously, he may have 
won the 2012 election on the strength of service 
delivery and infrastructure maintenance. With a 
renewed mandate in 2012, he would have been able 
to raise funds to implement the Mount Hagen City 
Redevelopment Plan.
Overall, the provincial bureaucracy needs real 
stimulation to get its house in order. Key areas to be 
improved include policy implementation, service 
delivery and financial management.
Evaluation II: Is This Good Melanesian 
Governance?
If provinces were ranked according to traditional 
Melanesian principles of governance, especially 
in the area of resource allocation, then we have to 
conclude that WHP has a poor record in political 
governance and service delivery.
Although this study was based on observations 
made in WHP, it draws from experiences in 
Southern Highlands and Eastern Highlands 
provinces (see Ketan 2009a and 2009b). 
Fundamentally, political governance and service 
delivery are crucial to realising the country’s long-
term development goals. In analysing governance 
issues at the sub-national level, it became apparent 
that WHP’s current governance practices are far too 
divorced from basic Melanesian principles of good 
governance. Pacific scholarship can be enriched by 
considering the following questions at the national 
level: Have state resources been used by politicians 
and public servants to improve the living conditions 
of all men, women and children across the country 
or to enrich only a few well-connected individuals? 
Have decisions by politicians and public servants 
regarding jobs and contracts been made in the 
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broader public interest or merely promote the 
narrow interests of a few people? Similar questions 
can be asked of politicians and bureaucrats at the 
provincial and district levels. In WHP, we have yet 
to find the answers to the common governance 
problems, although the Olga government (like 
the government of Father Lak) was not afraid 
to try new ways to improve governance and 
service delivery.
Several planning and governance models 
were considered at the inception of the Olga 
administration: 
• Consultative mode of governance — this form 
of governance involves the participation of 
ordinary people in decision-making processes, 
through community development forums, while 
at the same time providing the opportunity for 
expert advice through a provincial advisory 
board comprising professional Western 
Highlanders from various fields. (A strategy like 
this was used in Eastern Highlands Province 
under Governor Mal Kela Smith, with some 
success — and some resistance from officials.)
• Integrated planning — a development planning 
model that encapsulates all aspects of human 
development, on a basic needs approach, and 
integrated from ward to district to provincial to 
national development goals.
• Open budgeting — a budget should directly 
correspond to the basic needs and development 
priorities identified in the ward, district and 
provincial development plans. And the results 
or outcomes of the appropriations must be 
published annually for public inspection and 
comment.
• Regular monitoring and evaluation — 
both development planning and budget 
implementation need to be closely monitored to 
ensure effective use of state resources.
Based on Melanesian principles of governance, 
these models were aimed at improving political 
and economic governance, promoting wider 
participation in planning, ensuring greater 
levels of accountability and transparency in the 
disbursement of state resources, and providing vital 
information for planning and budgeting purposes.
Certain aspects of these models have 
been implemented, incrementally, but with 
disappointing results. The ideas of consultative 
mode of governance, integrated planning and Open 
budgeting were experimented in the first year of 
the Olga government, but these ideas were soon 
discarded as Governor Olga became more familiar 
with the mechanics of government. In hindsight, it 
would have been better had they been implemented 
in a more cohesive manner, although I doubt that 
any of these ideas would have worked without 
political will.
Conclusion
A number of conclusions can be drawn from 
this WHP case study and from similar studies 
on governance and service delivery in Southern 
Highlands and Eastern Highlands provinces (Ketan 
2009a and 2009b).
First, only a handful of provinces function 
effectively in the area of service delivery. Most 
provinces have failed to deliver services in the 
core MTDS areas of health, education, agriculture, 
infrastructure, and law and justice. Even provinces 
ranked by the NEFC as having the highest 
fiscal capacity have performed poorly in these 
areas. The reasons for abysmal performance 
include underfunding, excessive administrative 
expenditure, dreadful financial management, 
political interference, corruption, lawlessness, 
rugged terrain, and poor infrastructure. Standish 
(2013) provides comparable analysis of the political 
structures underlying failure in service delivery. In 
such situations, not all provinces have the capacity 
or resources required to provide basic services, 
yet they all continue to spend excessive money on 
salaries and emoluments, leaving little or nothing 
for services.
Second, the core functions of the public 
service have been hijacked by politicians and 
their supporters. Planning, budgeting, and 
service delivery are widely recognised as the core 
functions of the state in advanced democracies, 
but in developing democracies such as PNG, 
politicians have taken on the role of service 
providers rather than policy-makers. Budget 
formulation, for example, is often handled by the 
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governors’ support staff in Port Moresby, without 
input from public servants in the provinces. This 
deliberate marginalisation of public servants can 
adversely affect performance in a number of ways. 
At best, policy implementers show little interest 
in government business, other than collecting 
their salaries; at worst, public servants may even 
frustrate politicians by sabotaging implementation 
of MTDS sectoral programs and particularly MPs’ 
pet projects. This in turn fuels distrust between 
politicians and public servants, thereby negating 
legal and moral responsibility of state officials to 
provide goods and services to the people.
Third, the provincial and local government 
reforms ushered in by the Wingti–Chan 
governments of 1992–1995 have atrophied 
the demand and response principle of liberal 
democracies. Provincial governments under the 
previous three-tiered system of government created 
a kind of tension required for equitable, transparent 
and accountable distribution of services.15 Members 
of the former elected provincial assemblies were 
continuously under pressure from the voters to 
deliver services to their constituencies. These 
members were easily accessible to the people; 
indeed, they lived in small local communities, 
travelled on the same roads, and had access to 
the same services as their constituents. Elected 
members were accountable to the people not just 
every five years, but every day of their tenure.
Fourth, the accountability mechanisms within 
provinces were considerably weakened by the 
provincial and local government reforms of 1995. 
The new system of governance established under 
the OLPGLLG does not encourage governors 
and provincial executive council members to be 
accountable during their tenure in office. Open 
MPs now have funding, but lack the effective 
means of delivering services, while the provincial 
governments lack resources and effective control of 
what happens in districts. Actual service delivery 
has thus ceased to be a priority for those who 
currently occupy political offices. What is urgently 
required is a system of government that generates 
constant pressure on politicians and bureaucrats to 
deliver services to people across the country.
In this context, the national government should 
ideally repeal the OLPGLLG, thereby enabling 
a return to a three-tier government. It would 
remove Open members from their executive roles, 
and restrict them to scrutiny, policy-making and 
legislation over national issues. Such a system 
of government would give due recognition to 
the most accountable of all levels of government 
— local government — as well as strengthening 
accountability mechanisms at both provincial 
and national levels. A system of government 
that rewards provincial assembly members and 
national politicians to reside in their constituencies 
would be more effective than the present system 
— where national MPs dominate at all levels — 
and help promote good governance principles of 
transparency, accountability, equity, and democracy.
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Endnotes
1 Pastor Max Martin, Christian Leaders 
Training College, Banz, north Wahgi, personal 
communication, Port Moresby, April 2011.
2 I acknowledge with gratitude the useful comments 
provided by Dr Bill Standish and reviewers Dr John 
Burton and Dr Ron May on an earlier draft of 
this paper. Thanks also to Tracy Harwood and 
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Richard Eves for knocking this paper into shape for 
publication. I of course take full responsibility for 
the content.
3 My thanks to Mr Tom Olga and to provincial 
administrators Michael Wandil and Malcolm 
Culligan and their staff Joe Neng, Pym Mamandi, 
Ben Temon, Dr Robert Bruce, Steven Moka and Ben 
Laki for their help in understanding the situation 
in WHP. A special thanks to Nicholas Namba and 
his lieutenants, Regina and Rosa, for their warm 
hospitality at Kuk. Finally, I wish to thank Helen and 
Joy for being there for me.
4 This kind of behaviour goes back much further. 
The Kapal government’s 1985 ‘car deal’ led to the 
suspension of the provincial government by the 
Wingti-led national government (John Burton, 
personal communication, 2012).
5 Note that the buildings that Kapal Haus was built 
to replace were themselves burnt down. (Dr John 
Burton reminded me of this repeat behaviour.)
6 The 2012 national elections in the highlands could 
also have been failed on similar grounds if it had not 
been for the fact that PNG had just come out of a 
serious constitutional crisis caused by a leadership 
tussle between former prime minister Michael 
Somare and current Prime Minister Peter O’Neill, 
with the police and army divided between the rival 
political factions. On the basis of reports from 170 
domestic observers and voter feedback from teams 
throughout the country, Haley and Zubrinich (2012) 
concluded that the 2012 elections were worse than 
the 2007 elections.
7 Olga sought to implement the Ward Development 
Program (as specified by Section 26 of the Local-
Level Governments Administration Act 1997) — a 
joint national and provincial government initiative 
aimed at strengthening local leadership and social 
institutions, empowering disadvantaged groups, 
promoting good governance at ward and district 
levels, facilitating sustained economic growth, and 
improving the living conditions of people across the 
province. The Ward Development Program was also 
the intended vehicle for implementing the national 
government’s strategic development plans (the 
Medium Term Development Strategy 2011–2015, 
the Development Strategic Plan 2010–2030, and the 
Papua New Guinea Vision 2050 roadmap).
 By resourcing local communities, via LLG grants, 
and by providing technical assistance, the provincial 
government attempted to empower local leadership 
and family units. The idea was to allow people at 
the ward level to decide what is best for themselves 
and for their communities, in terms of planning, 
budgeting, prioritising projects, developing projects 
and evaluating their impact.
 Unfortunately for Olga, he was not successful in 
convincing Open MPs to support the program and, 
without support from the national government, the 
program did not get off the ground, and he lost the 
2012 elections. The idea, nonetheless, remains viable, 
and it seems that the O’Neill government is willing 
to do whatever it takes to bring services closer to the 
people, so a revised version of the Ward Development 
Program may still work.
8 DSIP allocations for 2012 were raised to K10 million 
per MP and this amount was maintained in 2013 
(hence the total figure of K36 million from 2007 to 
2013), which comes to a total of K3,204 million for 
the 89 districts. Open MPs are allocated an additional 
K500,000 annually in district support grants, while 
provincial MPs (governors) are entitled to only 
K500,000 in provincial support grants.
9 Student protests over the Morauta government’s 
attempts to privatise public enterprises had resulted in 
the fatal shooting of four young men, including three 
students, by police at the Waigani campus in the early 
hours of 26 June 2001.
10 The former prime minister made a strong impression 
on the young Olga when they met many years ago 
in Australia. Wingti’s son, Nathan, and Olga were 
students at the northern New South Wales town of 
Lismore, when Wingti, then prime minister, visited 
both young men and gave them some advice. To 
Nathan, Wingti said: ‘Son, you will be in charge of 
money’, and to Olga, ‘You will one day take my job’. 
It is claimed that Wingti gave his leadership to Olga 
at St Johns College, Lismore, years before the 2007 
elections. Wingti may or may not confirm this, but 
Olga tells this story with great delight. I first heard the 
story from Tom Olga’s father in Port Moresby in 2008.
11 Sir Mekere Morauta became the parliamentary leader 
of the People’s Democratic Movement Party in 1999 
and renamed it the PNG Party, but the People’s 
Democratic Movement Party was later revived by 
Paias Wingti and his supporters.
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm22                                                                                                                          State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
Joseph Ketan
12 The October 2010 visit was an example of how a 
prime minister makes big promises, which tells us 
a lot about national politics. In this case, despite the 
huge replica cheque flown in from Port Moresby, the 
WHPG waited in vain for the money to be released 
by the Department of National Planning.
13 The Jiwaka area has some of the most productive 
coffee plantations in WHP. The plantation industry is 
dominated by the Wahgi Mek Group, which operates 
a number of plantations on both sides of the Wahgi 
River. Jiwaka also has several important health and 
educational facilities, including Kudjip Nazarene 
Hospital, Christian Leaders Training College, and 
Fatima station. These economic and social assets will 
provide Jiwaka with a good foundation on which 
to build a viable province. The people of the ‘free 
country’ are renowned for their friendship and warm 
hospitality and will no doubt attract investors and 
workers to the new province. The Jimi, Wahgi and 
Kambia are giant valleys that can be turned into a 
food basket of the country.
14 These figures were given to me by Governor Olga. 
I have not been able to confirm the accuracy of this 
information.
15 Dr Thomas Webster, Director, National Research 
Institute, personal communication, November 2011.
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